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WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS IN VIRGINIA
WALTER E. HOFFMAN*
The ancient axiom "actio personalis moritur cum persona" is
gradually becoming obsolete by the passage of statutes in many states
and the liberal interpretation of such statutes. At common law the
"action died with the person" and no recovery was permitted for a
wrongful death, but in 1846, England abrogated the rule with the en-
actment of "Lord Campbell's Act."' Since that date the several states
throughout this country have similarly passed statutes dealing with the
subject and, in Virginia, Section 8-633 of the 195o Code of Virginia is
now effective, having been revised on numerous occasions since its pas-
sage in 1871.
As this article may be of greatest interest to students and prac-
titioners of the laws of Virginia, particular reference will be made to
decided cases and statutes of this state, although it is submitted that
many states have like statutes and similar interpretations.
In Virginia it is strange that so few attorneys have endeavored to
recover in tort actions for medical and hospital expenses preceding
death. Such expenses, as well as funeral expenses, are not provable in
an action for wrongful death. The Virginia statute creates a cause of
action for the benefit of those kin mentioned in the statute, free from
the claims of creditors of the decedent's estate,2 but no damages to the
estate of the decedent are provable under a count alleging and seeking
a recovery under the death by wrongful act statute. We all recognize
that, in the present age of rapidly moving motor vehicles and increas-
ing recklessness, many persons are seriously injured, lingering for many
days and months, and some ultimately die as a result of the injuries
received in such an "accident." With the tremendous increase of medi-
cal and hospital expenses, it is not unusual to hear of instances in-
volving required expenditures aggregating several thousands of dollars.
Yet when the action is instituted following the death, we invariably
are faced with the limitation of $15,ooo, 3 which, until 1942 was $1o,ooo,
and with the further realization that, in the trial of such an action,
*Member of the Norfolk, Va., Bar.
29 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (1846).
2The statute goes further and provides that if there be no designated bene-
ficiary entitled to the recovery, the same shall be assets in the hands of personal
representative, to be disposed of according to law.
Wa. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 8-636.
1951]
17o WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. VIII
the medical and hospital expense cannot be introduced in evidence.
During the year 1950, the General Assembly of Virginia enacted
what is now Section 8-628.1 of the Code of Virginia. This section reads
as follows:
"No cause of action for injuries to person or property shall be
lost because of the death of the person liable for the injury. No.
cause of action for injuries to person or property shall be lost
because of the death of the person in whose favor the cause of ac-
tion existed, provided, however, in such action no recovery can
be had for mental auguish, pain or suffering."'4
Insufficient time has elapsed for the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia to have before it the interpretation of this statute. It is sub-
mitted, however, that reason and precedent will now permit the re-
covery of medical, nursing and hospital expenses preceding death, and
it may be effectively argued that funeral expenses are likewise recover-
able within reasonable limitations. No doubt the pleadings in such ac-
tions will require separate counts or allegations in order to advise the
court and opposing counsel of the several claims, but this is of little
moment, and until the Section is interpreted by a court of last resort,
we may expect an influx of such actions.
By dicta, Virginia's highest court has heretofore inferred that a
recovery for medical expense, etc., preceding the death can be obtained.
In Stevenson v. Ritter Lumber Co.5 a parent instituted an action to re-
cover for the loss of services of his deceased son, alleging that he was
entitled to recover for such services for a period of five years following
the death of the infant, or until he would have attained his majority.
The court denied the right of recovery but said in its opinion:
"The statute, however, does not affect the right of action for
damages existing at common law in favor of a personal represen-
tative or a parent, to recover for losses between the time of an
injury and the resulting death of the person injured; nor, as it
would seem clear from the authorities, the right of the personal
representative of a person dying as a result of an injury caused
by a breach of a contractual duty on the part of the person, or
corporation, inflicting the injury, to recover in an action for
breach of.contract, the damages to the deceased's personal estate
arising in his lifetime from medical expenses and loss occasioned
by his inability to attend to business; nor the right of a parent to
recover in a proper case made for loss of the services of his
minor child to the date of the child's death by wrongful act."6
'Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 8-628.1 [italics supplied].
'1o8 Va. 575, 62 S. E. 351 (1908).
'Stevenson v. Ritter Lumber Co., io8 Va. 575, 581, 62 S. E. 353 (1908) [italics
supplied].
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Strange though it may seem, the foregoing case has apparently been
cited or commented upon by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
on only two occasions since the opinion of 19o8 and one of the ref-
erences was on a point entirely dissimilar from that now under con-
sideration.
7
The other Virginia cases casting light upon this problem are Ander-
son v. Hygeia Hotel Co.8 and Watson v. Daniel.9 The Anderson case
discusses the period of limitation for bringing an action of tort and,
while death did not ensue, the decision of the case turned upon the in-
quiry as to what actions terminated with the life of a person. There
is language in the opinion from which it may be argued that all right
of action respecting personal injuries resulting in death expire with the
death of the injured person, but conversely the opinion mentions the
common law right to sue for an injury done to the property or estate
of the decedent. In Watson v. Daniel, a father instituted an action
against a negligent defendant for medical expenses and loss of services
in connection with injuries sustained by an infant son. The court per-
mitted a recovery and overruled a plea of the one year statute of limita-
tions, holding that this constituted a claim for an injury to the father's
personal estate. The language of the opinion clearly indicates that a
claim for medical expense and loss of services would survive in the
event of the death of the father. With the enactment of Section 8-628.1
of the Code of Virginia, is it not equally clear that a claim for medical,
nursing and hospital expenses in behalf of an adult decedent will sur-
vive and constitute a right of action which is in addition to the right
of action granted under the death by wrongful act statute?
The Effect of Lien Statutes
It may be strenuously argued that the existence of certain lien
statutes in favor of physicians, nurses and hospitals in death cases, has
the effect of precluding a recovery in an independent action by a per-
sonal representative against a negligent third party. The pertinent por-
tions of these statutes are as follows:
"Whenever any person sustains personal injuries caused by
the alleged negligence of another and receives treatment in any
hospital, public or private, or receives medical attention or treat-
ment from any physician, or receives nursing service or care from
any registered nurse in this State, such hospital, physician or
nurse shall each have a lien for the amount of a just and reason-
"See Mercer v. City of Richmond, 152 Va. 736, 148 S. E. 803 (1929).
892 Va. 687, 24 S. E. 269 (1896).
0165 Va. 564, 183 S. E. 183 (1936).
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able charge for the service rendered, but not exceeding five
hundred dollars in the case of a hospital, one hundred dollars for
all physicians and one hundred dollars in the case of all nurses,
on the claim of such injured person or of his personal represen-
tative, against the person, firm or corporation whose negligence
is alleged to have caused such injuries, unless the injured per-
son, his personal representative or members of his family, is
paid under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation
Act."1 0
"In cases of personal injuries resulting in death and settle-
ment therefor by compromise or suit under the provisions of Sec.
8-633 to 8-640, the liens herein provided for may be asserted
against the recovery, or against the general estate of the decedent,
but not both. If asserted against the recovery and paid, such
liens shall attach prorata to the amounts received respectively
by such beneficiaries as are designated to receive the moneys
distributed and in their respective amounts; and such bene-
ficiaries, or the personal representative for their benefit, shall be
subrogated to the liens against the estate of such decedent pro-
vided for by Sec. 64-147. '"1
Thus, while the death by wrongful act statute provides for the pay-
ment of any recovery to designated beneficiaries "free from all debts
and liabilities of the deceased... "12 the corresponding lien statutes
do create a method of payment to hospitals, physicians and nurses
which in effect make any recovery subject to the limitations set forth in
the statute for such claims. The late 0. L. Shackelford, Judge of the
Court of Law and Chancery of the City of Norfolk, in a case from
which no appeal was taken, made this comment in discussing the effect
of these lien statutes:
"The only effect of the statute is to protect pro tanto the rights
of those who have rendered services to the injured person pend-
ing his demise. In other words, it in effect adds their particular
condition to the extent specified in the statute, to those other
beneficiaries mentioned in the statutes creating the cause of ac-
tion and regulating the distribution of the recovery."
It is submitted that the reasoning of this learned trial judge is
sound, and it is now better fortified since the passage of Section 8-628.1
of the Code of Virginia.
When medical expenses, etc., are rendered necessary by reason of
the negligent act of a third party, an injury is caused to the property
of the injured party and, under the provisions of Section 8-628.1, it
"Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 32-138 [italics supplied].
'Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 195o) § 32-141.
'Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 8-638.
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would appear that the right of action survives to the personal repre-
sentative in the event of death. In fact, the lien statutes quoted above
give a right of subrogation against the general estate of the decedent;
does this not constitute an injury to the property of the decedent?
Funeral Expenses
The right of recovery of funeral expenses has never been determined
by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. Whether the newly en-
acted statute is sufficient to sustain the argument that such a recovery
was within the contemplation of the General Assembly of Virginia
is admittedly debatable. In cases involving the death of an infant it
would appear, by the greater weight of authority, that a parent could
maintain such an action. While funeral expenses were not involved
in the case of Watson v. Daniel,13 the loss is none the less direct and
would constitute a pecuniary loss to the personal estate of the parent,
as the parent is entitled to the services of the child and, as an incident
to this right, became liable for the infant's support, including the medi-
cal care and, upon death, the funeral expenses. Such a claim would be
a damage to the estate of the parent and not to the parent's person. If
the parent is admittedly entitled to a claim for loss of services to the
date of death, it would seem to follow that the same unconditional
right to reimbursement existed for funeral expenses, subject only to
the reasonableness and necessity of such expenses. By reasoning we must
observe that if any infant attains the age of majority, it would no
longer be the legal duty of the parent to pay for such burial expenses;
hence, the loss, in cases involving death of an infant, rests upon the
parent.
The authorities denying a recovery for funeral expenses justify
their ruling upon the theory that the time of payment of such expenses
is merely accelerated by the wrongful death. In infant cases resulting
in death this rule should not be applied.14 Under the same reasoning
a husband has been permitted to recover funeral expenses incurred in
connection with his wife's death, he being legally obligated to bury
his wife in a suitable manner if he possessed the means to do so.15
When an adult is killed and no member of the family is legally
obligated to incur the burial expenses, we are met with the old adage
that no person can escape "death and taxes." It follows that the wrong-
ful death has merely accelerated the payment of funeral expenses. We
165 Va. 564, 83 S. E. 83 (1936).
"4Marshall v. Miller, 112 Kan. 7o6, 42 Pac. 883 (1923).
'Philby v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 46 Wash. 173, 89 Pac. 468 (igo7).
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see some elements of danger in permitting the recovery of funeral ex-
penses in such cases which has sometimes been extended to include the
cost of a tombstone. While the reasonableness of such expense remains
with the court and jury, in the absence of a statutory limitation, the
matter of the station-in-life occupied by the decedent may well justify
expenses which are prohibitive, thereby increasing insurance rates and
adversely affecting the public in general. It may be argued that the same
problem exists with respect to burial expenses of an infant but, as has
been suggested, the theory of recovery is entirely different.
Several cases outside of Virginia have been heretofore cited. The
general rule has been stated as follows:
"So, too, without the aid of any statute there may be a recovery
for medical and other expenses up to the time of death, and in
some jurisdictions, but not others, this right has been extended
even to the recovery of funeral expenses."10
It would be meaningless to discuss the cited cases as it is apparent that
there is a sharp conflict of authority. Under the English, Canadian
and some American cases, it is held that acceleration of burial expenses
is insufficient to justify a recovery. However it appears that a majority
of the cases from this country permit a recovery for medical, hospital
and nursing services, and also permit a recovery for funeral expenses
under the theory that a wrongdoer is responsible for his own acts and
cannot be permitted to take advantage of the theory of accelerated pay-
ment of burial expenses.
Conclusion
As the writer analyzes Section 8-628.1 of the Code of Virginia there
should no longer be any real dispute with respect to the recovery for
loss of services, medical, hospital and nursing expenses. The death
statute should not have the effect of limiting the operation of the sur-
vival statute to cases where death occurred from causes other than the
injuries on which the action is grounded. The two causes of action are
complementary and not repugnant to each other. They may be main-
tained independently of each other or, as under the system prevailing
in Virginia to avoid multiplicity of suits, should be instituted under
separate counts under the Virginia Notice of Motion Statute.
17
Summarizing the foregoing, it is the writer's conclusion that:
(i) In cases involving the death of an infant, the personal
1025 C. J. S., Death § 13; 25 C. J. S., Death § io8 deals more fully with the sub-
ject matter. Other authorities are collected in Notes (1920) 7 A. L. R. 1334, (1935)
94 A. L. R. 438, and (1946) 163 A. L. R. 26o.
"Wa. Code Ann. (Michie, 195o) § 8-715 et seq.
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representative may maintain the action for wrongful death, and
the injured parent may bring a separate suit for loss of services
to the time of death, plus medical, hospital, nursing and burial
expenses within the limits of the rule of reasonableness which
should exclude the cost of a tombstone.
(2) In cases involving the death of an adult, the personal
representative may maintain in one action under separate counts,
a suit to recover for the wrongful death, and the medical, hos-
pital and nursing expenses preceding death. As to the funeral
expenses in such cases, the matter is an open question.
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